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Denying Leniency to Cartel Instigators: 
Costs and Benefits 
 
Abstract 
 
A large number of countries have introduced successful leniency programs into their competition 
law enforcement to encourage colluding firms to come forward with evidence that will help 
detect cartels and punish price-fixers.  This paper studies a feature of some of these programs 
that has received relatively little attention in the literature:  the inclusion of “No Immunity for 
Instigators Clauses” (NIICs).  These provisions deny leniency benefits to parties that instigate 
cartel behavior or function as cartel ringleaders.  Our results show that NIICs can lead to 
increased or decreased levels of cartel conduct.  By removing the instigator’s benefit from 
cooperating with the authorities, a NIIC undoes some of the destabilizing benefit the leniency 
program was intended to generate and thereby furthers cartel stability.  On the other hand, the 
instigator faces an asymmetrically severe punishment under a NIIC and this can reduce the 
incentive to instigate in the first place. 
 
Keywords:  antitrust, collusion, leniency programs, instigators 
JEL Codes:  L41, L12, K21  
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I. Introduction 
Price-fixing, the term used here to represent a larger set of collusive agreements among 
competitors to reduce competition between themselves, has long been the most universally 
condemned of the antitrust offences.  This is explained, at least in part, by the fact that naked 
price-fixing has very little or no efficiency benefits to weigh against the obvious harms caused 
by higher prices and associated effects.  The strong antipathy toward collusion has resulted in 
many national competition laws that treat certain classic collusive practices as per se illegal, and 
also in this behavior being treated as criminal conduct in many jurisdictions.1 
Passing laws against collusion is one thing, but detecting and convicting participants for 
secretive price-fixing is quite another.   As the real evidence of price-fixing resides with the 
participants, a number of national competition regimes have for many years provided incentives 
for participants to come forward with information by promising amnesty or leniency.  Since its 
reform in 1993, the Corporate Leniency Policy introduced by the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) has been widely regarded as the most successful policy in history in detecting 
cartels affecting American interests.2  Following on this success many other countries introduced 
or revised their own leniency programs (“LPs”), for example there are such programs now in 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union and India.3 
The implementation of these programs and their apparent success has, not surprisingly, 
attracted the attention of researchers trying to understand the full implications of these programs 
                                                          
1 There are criminal prohibitions for price-fixing in, among other countries:  Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. See, e.g. Stephan (2014).   
2 Scott Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney General reported in 2005:  “The Antitrust Division’s Corporate 
Leniency Program has been the Division’s most effective investigative tool.  Cooperation from leniency applicants 
has cracked more cartels than all other tools at our disposal combined.”  Hammond (2005). 
3 Of the 56 countries with antitrust laws in place in the study by Borell et al. (2012), only 10 are reported as not 
having leniency policies.  These include Argentina, Jordan, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand and Venezuela.  
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and how to optimize them for maximum social benefit.4  However, one important feature of 
some LPs has not been well studied.  In several countries with programs, such as the United 
States, Australia and Brazil, leniency is not available to parties viewed as instigators or 
ringleaders of the cartels.  We refer here to such excluding provisions as “no immunity to 
instigator clauses” or “NIICs”.5    Interestingly, as well, some jurisdictions have implemented 
NIICs only to subsequently remove them.6 
Our purpose here is to explore the implications of adding NIICs to LPs for both the 
establishment of collusive agreements and the detection of such agreements when they are put 
into effect.  We find that NIICs can have ambiguous effects on the suppression of cartels.  It is 
easy to understand why this might be the case.  On the one hand, by removing the availability of 
leniency to instigators the NIIC undoes some of the supposed benefit of the LP itself – making 
more credible the instigator’s commitment to its cartel partners and thereby serving cartel 
stability.  On the other hand, a potential instigator in a jurisdiction with a NIIC faces asymmetric, 
and harsher, punishments relative to its cartel partners who continue to enjoy the option of 
leniency applications.  This can reduce any party’s incentive to instigate a cartel and it will 
                                                          
4 Research continues to examine the extent to which the apparent success of leniency programs – as suggested by 
their very wide-spread adoption around the world -- is real.  Miller (2009) studies the U.S. experience and finds 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of the American leniency program at enhancing cartel detection and 
deterrence capabilities.  De (2010) finds evidence that leniency policies have made cartels more fragile in Europe.  
Brenner (2009) gets somewhat more mixed results studying the European experience:  while investigations become 
more efficient with leniency, there is less clear evidence that cartel stability has been reduced.  Borrell et al. (2012) 
study the effect of leniency policy on business executives’ perceptions of antitrust effectiveness as revealed in 
regular surveys conducted by the International Institute for Management Development.  They find that leniency 
programs are associated with perceptions of enhanced antitrust effectiveness, particularly for countries with lower 
effectiveness ratings.   
5 For example, in the US, in order to apply for amnesty or leniency, the leniency policy requires that “the 
corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or 
originator of, the activity”, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Corporate Leniency Policy at A.6 
(http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm). 
6 For example, the EU (removed in 2006) and Canada (removed in 2010).  In a unique situation, China’s State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) has a leniency policy with a NIIC (applying to “organizers of 
monopoly agreements”) for non-price monopoly agreements while the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) has no NIIC in its leniency policy related to price-monopoly agreements.  See Ye (2014).    
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reduce incentives for the instigator (and in some cases others as well) to cooperate with the 
authorities once investigations are underway.   
We believe that our results suggest that caution be exercised before a competition authority 
includes a NIIC as part of its leniency program.  In addition to recognized challenges associated 
with identifying which participant is the actual “instigator” for the purposes of applying a NIIC, 
we see here that the clause may actually stabilize collusion by giving participants more 
confidence that others will not provide incriminating evidence to the authorities.   Therefore, 
while a NIIC may reflect a jurisdiction’s laying greater blame for cartel behavior on instigators, 
it could be poor antitrust policy. 
The next section of the paper briefly reviews much of the economics literature on LPs, 
including the few papers that touch on issues closely related to those explored here.  It also 
provides an overview of the model used here.  Section III then presents the full model.  Sections 
IV and V present our results, respectively, for the case of an LP without and then with a NIIC.  
In Section VI we explore a special case of our model -- simplified in some dimensions -- that 
allows us to explore the implications of adding firm asymmetry.  Section VII then provides our 
conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
II. Literature and Model Overview 
An earlier and seminal contribution on the economic theory of LPs was that by Motta and Polo 
(2003), which was followed by notable contributions from Spagnolo (2004), Aubert, Rey and 
Kovacic (2006), Feess and Walzl (2004), Motchenkova (2004), Chen and Harrington (2007) and 
Harrington (2008), among others. A detailed review of the literature on LPs is provided in 
Spagnolo (2008). While there is a huge variation in these models, a general conclusion was that 
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an LP does generally make collusion among firms more difficult, though the literature does point 
to some notable exceptions. 
In fact, Motta and Polo (2003) themselves pointed out that, while LPs can indeed destabilize 
cartels, they can also have collusive effects. In particular firms may choose to collude but then 
report (“reveal” in their terminology) to the authorities when the probability of conviction rises, 
in which case the LP reduces their expected fines from collusion. They also demonstrated that if 
leniency is made available to firms even after an investigation has been opened, the program 
would be more effective – indeed, in their model, an LP is not effective if it is available only 
before the investigation. Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2004) however provided models in which 
pre-investigation leniency is also effective since it increases the gains from deviation. This is 
because defecting cartel members can now reveal and evade paying potential fines.  
Harrington (2008) considers the effectiveness of LPs in a novel framework, when the 
probability of detection and successful prosecution changes over time. The Harrington model 
also considers whether more than the first party to cooperate should be offered leniency.  
Harrington shows that the optimal leniency program should provide amnesty to only the “first-
party in”, similar to the US LP, and unlike the EU and Canadian LPs.  
As noted earlier, relatively little formal attention has been paid in this literature to the 
possible effects of the asymmetric treatment of instigators or ringleaders – in particular the 
inclusion of NIICs into the LP.7   That said, several authors have conjectured as to how such 
agreements might affect collusion and detection – in some cases suggesting possible effects 
                                                          
7 As with Bos and Wandschneider (2012), we do not draw any distinction between instigator and ringleader and 
model them as the same kind of actor.  In an interesting recent paper, Davies and De (2013) examine the record of 
89 European cartels between 1990 and 2008 to determine the frequency with which ringleaders appear and the kinds 
of roles such firms play in their cartels. 
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modeled here.8  Two other recent papers that do formally consider asymmetric treatment are 
Herre et al. (2012) and Bos and Wandschneider (2012).  These papers offer complementary 
treatments to that provided here, presenting very different models (differences highlighted here 
as we proceed), though both share our interest in understanding the complicated relationship 
between NIICs and the incidence and detection of collusion.  In a model in which no one firm 
has enough evidence to generate a conviction and side-payments between cartelists are 
permitted, Herre et al. (2012) show that adding a NIIC will have little effect when the instigator 
(“ringleader” in their terms) has a large amount of evidence to provide authorities, particularly if 
the base probability of authority investigation is low.  Bos and Wandschneider (2012) study the 
effect on the highest sustainable cartel price of introducing a NIIC.9  They find that excluding 
ringleaders will generally (but not always) lead to lower cartel prices.   
Interestingly, there has been some experimental work on leniency that has considered the 
implications of asymmetric treatment for ringleaders.  Bigoni et al. (2012) have recently 
provided results questioning the value of NIICs at enhancing cartel deterrence or moderating 
prices in active cartels.10    
In its structure, the model here is closest to that of Motta and Polo (2003), with the important 
addition of the instigation stage and special policy treatment of instigators.  To facilitate 
exposition and comparison with this earlier important work, we employ similar notation and 
terminology.  We model a market in which two firms, initially symmetric, compete in an 
infinitely-repeated game. One firm may elect to suggest a collusive agreement – this is the act of 
                                                          
8 Aubert et al. (2006) and Spagnolo (2008) are notable examples.   
9 Their cartel model is based on that in Bos and Harrington (2010).   
10  In Bigoni et al. (2012), subjects play a differentiated Bertrand price game in an infinitely repeated game 
framework. While LPs deter a larger fraction of cartels from forming, they also lead to higher prices in those cartels 
that are not reported. If there are positive rewards for whistle-blowing, however, complete deterrence can be 
achieved. When the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program, they find that fewer cartels are deterred, 
while the prices in remaining cartels are higher than otherwise.  
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instigation – and if the other agrees the agreement is confirmed and a violation of the 
competition law committed.  The firms realize that such an agreement could be detected and 
punished by the Antitrust Authority (AA).  If convicted firms face fines of F unless granted 
leniency.  A conviction requires the realization of two separate events – first the AA must 
commence an investigation, second the investigation must result in a successful prosecution.  
These probabilities are taken as exogenous parameters here, determined by public policy 
decisions outside this model.  The probability the AA opens an investigation is given as α; and 
the probability of conviction, conditional on firms coming to an agreement and the AA launching 
an investigation is given as ρ.   
After reaching an agreement, each firm independently elects whether or not to honor the 
agreement.  Importantly, we assume that defecting does not remove antitrust liability – the 
offense is committed by simply achieving agreement.11  Subsequent to the realization of payoffs 
from colluding or defecting, the AA may (randomly) open an investigation. At this point, the 
parties may take advantage of the LP and choose to cooperate with the AA (“reveal”).  If any 
firm reveals, conviction of all parties is assured and punishments handed out. Firms eligible 
under the LP that choose to reveal will pay a reduced fine, FLP, here we assume FLP = 0.12   If 
neither firm reveals, the continuing probability of conviction remains at ρ.    
Any disruption to the collusive equilibrium is assumed to end the cartel forever.  That is, 
should either or both firms defect from the collusive agreement or should collusion be punished 
                                                          
11 This assumption is partly based on the idea that even a defecting firm may have prices well in excess of 
competitive prices, such that its customers are still hurt by its entry into the agreement.  Moreover, a firm may be 
held liable for its previous acts of collusion if it chooses to defect in a later period.  
12 Only one firm is entitled to leniency, so if both firms reveal the “first one in” is determined randomly here.  Of 
course, if a NIIC is in place, the instigator is not eligible for leniency.   
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by the AA, the industry will revert to static non-cooperative Nash equilibrium behavior 
forever.13     
With this basic structure we examine the scope for collusion with and without a NIIC as part 
of the LP.  To do this we focus on regions in the space defined by different values of two key 
enforcement parameters, α and F, over which various equilibria obtain.  For some values, for 
example, very high values of F, it will always be the case that collusion cannot be supported in 
equilibrium.  This would also be the case for high values of the probability of investigation, α, if 
the probability of conviction given investigation (ρ) was also very high.  For other values it is 
possible that there will be equilibria in which firms collude but reveal when an investigation 
starts, while there will generally be regions in which firms collude but do not reveal when an 
investigation is launched.  We show that the introduction of the NIIC has two key effects on the 
parameter spaces over which collusion can arise and, when it does arise, be detected and 
punished.   
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of a NIIC removes the incentive of the instigator to ever 
reveal the presence of collusion and this will reduce the possibility that the non-instigator will 
want to reveal to protect itself.  This has the effect of narrowing the range of parameter values 
over which both parties choose to reveal, with the result that collusion is less likely to be 
detected after it has begun.  The NIIC does, however, also reduce the incentive of firms to take 
the first step toward collusion – to be the instigator – and this can reduce the incidence of 
collusion.  Interestingly, the first effect (reduced incentive to reveal) can lead, under some 
parameter values, to the support of collusion where it would otherwise not previously have been 
possible because of the firms’ expectations that their rivals would reveal.   
                                                          
13 These assumptions are similar to those in Herre et al. (2012) and Bos and Wandschneider (2012) but different 
from the approach in Motta and Polo (2003).  In the latter case, the authors allow the parties to return to collusion 
after detection, under some circumstances even if the firms have chosen to reveal.   
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In a later section of the paper we explore a special case of the main model into which it is 
possible to introduce some asymmetry between firms that serves to illustrate some additional 
conditions under which adding a NIIC to a LP may actually support collusion.  The key insight 
derived here is that the application of a NIIC when the instigator would otherwise be the 
“weakest link” (i.e. the most likely to defect and apply for immunity) will serve to make the 
instigator’s promise to adhere to cartel agreements more credible.  This will enhance, rather than 
diminish, cartel stability. 
III. The Model and Timing 
Two symmetric firms compete in a market for an infinite number of periods.  If both firms play 
static Nash equilibrium strategies per-period profits will be πN for each.  If they collude on the 
joint monopoly price, they will achieve per-period profits of πM each.14  Should one firm defect 
on a collusive agreement while the other honors that agreement, the defector gets profits that 
period of πD while its rival gets the payoff of πS.  As in the standard prisoner’s dilemma, we 
assume that πD > πM > πN > πS. 
In the absence of any antitrust liability, and on the assumption that firms adopt the grim 
strategy of playing competitively forever should either of them defect, it is well-known that 
collusion can be supported if the firms put sufficient value on future profits, that is if their 
(common) discount factor, δ, is greater than the critical level δ0, given by:   
)(
)(
0 ND
MD
ππ
ππδ
−
−
= . 
                                                          
14 We think of this collusive agreement is simply agreeing on a common (monopoly) price and do not permit 
colluding firms to make side-payments to each other.  Given the symmetry here with the simple leniency program 
this is not a restrictive assumption, however under a NIIC the instigator might demand some compensation for the 
extra risks it is assuming.  The possibility of side-payments is considered in Herre et al. (2012).  
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To make the following analysis meaningful, we focus on situations in which a cartel agreement 
would have been sustainable  in the absence of antitrust enforcement; that is we assume that
0δδ > .   
As we now introduce antitrust enforcement and a leniency programs, the timing of the game, 
within each period becomes: 
Stage 0: The AA moves first, setting the probability of investigation, α and probability of 
successful prosecution (given investigation has started), ρ. We take these decisions as 
exogenously given in our analysis.15 
Stage 1: The firms choose whether or not to instigate. If neither instigates, then the firms 
compete in the product market in non-cooperative Nash fashion, get the corresponding payoffs 
and the game ends for that period. We move to period 2, where the game again starts from stage 
1. If both firms instigate, one is assigned the role of instigator randomly. 
Stage 2: If there has been instigation by one firm, the other firm either agrees to form a cartel or 
refuses to do so. In case of the latter, the game ends for this period, and the firms move on to the 
next period with one-period non-cooperative Nash payoffs. 
Stage 3: If firms agree to collude at stage 2, the firms set the prices (or quantities) in the product 
market, either colluding or defecting from the collusion. They obtain their one period collusive 
payoffs, or their payoffs from defecting (or being cheated on). 
Stage 4: With probability α, the Antitrust Authority (AA) begins an investigation of the industry. 
Stage 5: Either (or both) firm(s) may apply for leniency by revealing information to the AA. 
Stage 6: If either or both firms have revealed, the cartel is convicted with certainty and members 
are punished as provided for in the cartel law and the LP.  If neither firm reveals, conviction is 
                                                          
15 Motta and Polo’s (2003) treatment includes an analysis of optimal enforcement policies.   
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obtained with probability ρ.  A firm eligible for the LP that reveals pays a fine of zero, other 
firms pays F.  If both firms are eligible for leniency and reveal, they each secure leniency with 
probability of ½.  
In the event of any defection or successful cartel prosecution firms revert to static Nash non-
cooperative play forever.   
Note that with the timing as outlined in stages 3 to 5, we are ruling out the possibility that firms will 
reveal as they defect, before any investigation has been launched.  While our approach follows the timing 
in Motta and Polo (2003), other papers have employed this alternative timing (e.g. Harrington (2008) and 
Chen and Rey (2013)).  In Section VII below – and in more detail in Appendix 3 – we modify our model 
to allow for revealing with defection and derive results qualitatively similar to those from our main model.   
 
IV. Analysis of the Leniency Program 
At the outset we should note that firms face a stationary environment over time in the sense that 
the probabilities of investigation and conviction, α and ρ, are the same in every period.  
Accordingly, in every period t > 1, the firms will want to continue the collusive agreement as 
long as they choose to enter into the agreement in period 1 and the cartel has not broken down 
(due to defection or conviction) prior to t.   Thus, we can analyze a firm’s incentives to collude, 
defect, or reveal in the same way for every period.   
The equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect equilibrium.  Moreover, we assume that a 
firm would choose a (weakly or strongly) dominant strategy in any subgame in which such a 
strategy exists.  This helps reduce the number of equilibria we have to consider.  
 
IV.1 The Revelation Game at Stage 5   
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To study the subgame perfect equilibrium, we start with firms’ choices at stage 5 in any period t.  
Assuming that a collusive agreement has been reached (t = 1) or continued (t > 1) at the 
beginning of this period, we have three possible scenarios at stage 5: (1) neither firm has 
defected from the collusive agreement at stage 3 in this period; (2) one of the two firms has 
defected from the agreement in the period, or (3) both firms have defected from the agreement in 
the period.  
Let VC denote a firm’s expected payoff from entering into a collusive agreement.  To 
simplify presentation, we define a new variable, ρ~ , which takes on the value ρ if  AA launches 
an investigation, and 0 otherwise.  Using this notation, we can write the firms’ payoffs associated 
with different strategies as given in Table 1 for the subgame associated with the scenario in 
which neither firm has defected at stage 3.  
 
Table 1: The Revelation Game at Stage 5 in the case where neither firm has defected 
              Firm 2 
Firm 1 
Reveal Not reveal 
Reveal 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
, 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,  𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
Not reveal 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,   𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝑀 + 𝜌� � 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹� + (1 − 𝜌�)𝛿𝑉𝐶 ,   
𝜋𝑀 + 𝜌� � 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹� + (1 − 𝜌�)𝛿𝑉𝐶 
 
It is easy to see from Table 1 that (Not Reveal, Not Reveal) would be a Nash equilibrium in 
this subgame if   
                      
δ
δππδρ
δ
δπρπ
−
+≥−+





−
−
+
1
)~1(
1
~
N
MC
N
M VF .       (1) 
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From (1) we can solve the critical value of ρ~  below which (Not Reveal, Not Reveal) would be a 
Nash equilibrium in the subgame represented by Table 1, defined by   
FV
V
NC
NC
)1(])1[(
])1[(*
δπδδ
πδδρ
−+−−
−−
= .      (2) 
Note from (2) that ρ* > 0 if and only if )1/( δπ −> NCV , i.e. the payoff from collusion has to be 
higher than that from competition.   The latter is, of course, a condition for firms to enter into a 
collusive agreement in the first place.  Therefore, ρ* > 0 holds along any equilibrium path 
following a collusive agreement.  
Note that (Reveal, Reveal) is always a Nash equilibrium in the subgame represented in Table 
1.  If this equilibrium always prevails for both values of ρ~ , collusion collapses at the end of the 
first period, with each firm receiving an expected fine of F/2.  Anticipating this, each firm would 
choose Defect at stage 3.  This, in turn, implies that the two firms would not enter into a 
collusive agreement in the first place.  To keep the analysis interesting, we assume that in the 
event that AA does not launch an investigation (i.e., if 0~ =ρ ), each firm would choose Not 
Reveal in the subgame represented in Table 1.16 
Moreover, we also need to specify what criterion we use to select an equilibrium in cases 
where ρρ =~  and *ρρ < . Among the many refinements of Nash equilibriums in the literature, 
we choose one that can best reflect the ideas we want to capture in this model.  One of these 
ideas is related to the fact that the NIIC eliminates the incentives of the instigator to reveal.  
Accordingly, the non-instigator does not have to be concerned about the possibility of revelation 
by the instigator when the NIIC is in place.  In contrast, without the NIIC the non-instigator 
                                                          
16 Alternatively, if we assume that (Reveal, Reveal) is a Nash equilibrium in Table 1 for both values of 𝜌�, the two 
firms would never collude because of the deterrence effect of  the leniency program.  The NIIC, on the other hand, 
causes collusion to arise under some circumstances (as shown in Appendix 1).  In other words, the NIIC will expand 
the set of parameter values over which collusion occurs.   Therefore, adopting this alternative assumption would 
strengthen our conclusion that the NIIC can expand the set of parameter values over which collusion occurs.   
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always has to contend with this possibility.  This, we believe, should affect the firms’ behavior in 
the equilibria with and without the NIIC.   
To capture and examine the above idea in our model, we use “strategic riskiness” as a 
selection criterion to select the equilibrium in cases where ρρ =~  and *ρρ < .17  In a symmetric 
game such as the one represented in Table 1, an equilibrium is less strategically risky (and is 
therefore selected)  if each firm’s equilibrium strategy is the best reply to the other firm’s 
strategy of randomizing with equal probability between Reveal and Not Reveal.  Hence, strategic 
riskiness captures the idea that, without the NIIC, each firm is not certain that the other firm will 
choose Not Reveal and its decision takes into account this uncertainty.    
To find the conditions under which firms enter into and honor a collusive agreement, we 
must consider what happens if one of them defects.  Table 2 illustrates the subgame that they 
face at stage 5 if firm 1 has defected from the collusive agreement at stage 3.  We can see from 
Table 2 that Reveal is a strictly dominant strategy if ρρ =~ , in which case the unique Nash 
equilibrium involves both firms choosing Reveal.   If 0~ =ρ , (Not Reveal, Not Reveal) is also a 
Nash equilibrium in this stage game.  However, Reveal is a weakly dominant strategy.  As 
indicated earlier, in cases where there is a dominant strategy, we assume that the firms will 
choose that strategy in the equilibrium; that is, they choose Reveal in Table 2.   
We can construct another table like Table 2 for the case where firm 2 has defected from the 
collusive agreement at stage 3.  Since it will be symmetric to Table 2, we omit it here for brevity.  
In addition, we also omit the analysis for the case where both firms have defected from the 
collusive agreement.  Given that our interest is in finding the conditions under which collusion 
                                                          
17 Strategic riskiness as a selection criterion can be thought of as an extension of Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) 
concept of risk dominance to infinitely repeated games.  In an earlier paper on leniency, Spagnolo (2004) uses this 
concept, which is developed theoretically in Blonski et al (2013) and Blonski and Spagnolo (2014).  We are grateful 
to an anonymous referee for drawing this literature to our attention. 
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occurs, the latter is not needed for the analysis of a firm’s incentives to enter into and honor a 
collusive agreement. 
  
Table 2: The Revelation Game at Stage 5 in the case where firm 1 has defected 
              Firm 2 
Firm 1 
Reveal Not reveal 
Reveal 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
, 𝜋𝑆 +  𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,  𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
Not reveal 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,   𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝜌�𝐹,    𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝜌�𝐹 
 
 
  
IV.2 The Boundary between C/R and C/NR Equilibria 
Given the above model specifications, we can make a distinction between two types of equilibria 
associated with Table 1.  In the first one, both firms would choose Reveal if there is an 
investigation, but Not Reveal if there is no investigation in period t.  We name this type of 
equilibria C/R equilibrium, in which firms collude and then reveal (if there is an investigation).  
In the second type of equilibria, both firms choose Not Reveal independent of whether there is an 
investigation. We refer to this as the C/NR ("collude and not reveal") equilibrium.  
Before we investigate the characteristics of C/R and C/NR equilibria in detail, we first derive 
the condition that defines the boundary between C/R equilibria and C/NR equilibria.  As 
indicated earlier, a C/R equilibrium exists whenever there is a C/NR equilibrium under the 
leniency program, and, in such situations of multiple equilibria, we use the principle of strategic 
riskiness to select the relevant equilibrium.  Accordingly, our goal here is to derive a boundary 
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condition that separates the situations where a C/R equilibrium is risk-dominant from those 
where a C/NR equilibrium is risk-dominant. 
Let VCR denote the sum of discounted profit stream in a C/R equilibrium, and VCNR the sum of 
discounted profit stream in a C/NR equilibrium. Using Table 1, we can express the former as  
                           





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+−+=
21
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δ
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Solving (3), we obtain: 
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Similarly, we can express VCNR as: 
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Solving the above to obtain: 
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Since the game in Table 1 is symmetric, a risk-dominant equilibrium can be found by 
identifying each firm’s best reply to the other firm’s mixed strategy with equal probabilities.  
This implies that (Reveal, Reveal) is a risk-dominant equilibrium if each firm’s expected payoff 
from choosing Reveal, 
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is at least as high as that from choosing Not Reveal,18  
                                                          
18 In (8), we assume that each firm knows that the other firm will choose either Reveal in every period or Not Reveal 
in every period whenever they are in this subgame.  If it observes Not Reveal in the present period, it can infer that 
the other firm will choose Not Reveal in all future periods. Thus, in (8) we use CNRV  for CV .  
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Using (6), we can rewrite this condition as:  
αδρρδ
ππρδ
α
3)21)(1(
))(1(2)(
++−
−−
≡Φ≥
NM
F .      (9) 
In other words, )(αΦ=F  defines the boundary that separates the C/R equilibria from the C/NR 
equilibria. It can be shown that 0)(' <Φ α , which means that the curve )(αΦ=F  is downward-
sloping (see, for example, Figure 1).   
IV.3 The C/R Equilibria 
In order for firms to reach and honor a collusive agreement in a C/R equilibrium, the following 
two incentive compatibility constraints have to be satisfied:  
(IC1) DCR VV ≥ , and  
(IC2) NCR VV ≥ ,  
where DV  is the expected payoff associated with defecting from the agreement and VN is the 
payoff from playing the non-cooperative equilibrium forever.19  Using Table 2, we can express 
DV  as  
                                           21
FV
N
DD −
−
+=
δ
δππ .    (10) 
The payoff from playing the non-cooperative equilibrium is standard:  
                                                      )1( δ
π
−
=
N
NV .
   
    (11) 
                                                          
19 Though we refer to IC2 as an incentive compatibility constraint, it might also be described as a participation 
constraint.  
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Depending on the value of F, one of IC1 and IC2 will be redundant.  To be more specific, it 
can be shown that VD > VN if and only if )(2 NDF ππ −< .  Therefore, IC1 is tighter if 
)(2 NDF ππ −< , and IC2 is tighter if )(2 NDF ππ −> .  
Using (4) and (10), we rewrite the IC1 constraint, DCR VV ≥ , as:
 
 
)1)(1(
)()1(2)(2)(
δα
ππδαππα
−−
−−−−
≡Γ≥
NDMD
F  .   (12) 
Define δδα /1 01 −≡ .  Using (12) we can easily show that 0)( >Γ α  for 1αα > , and that
0)(' >Γ α .  Thus, )(αΓ is an upward-sloping curve with a horizontal intercept 1α , as can be seen 
in Figure 1.  
The positive slope of )(αΓ  has the interesting implication that, starting from a point just 
below this curve, a larger fine (F) would actually induce firms to enter into a collusive agreement.  
The reason for this counter-intuitive observation is that F enters both (4) and (5) with a negative 
sign.  In other words, a larger fine reduces the payoff from collusion and the payoff from 
defection.  From (4) and (10) we find that  
                                           0<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
F
V
F
V CRD .       (13) 
Thus, a larger fine reduces the payoff from defection by more than it reduces the payoff from 
collusion, increasing the range of parameter values under which collusion will be sustainable.   
Using (4) and (11), we rewrite the IC2 constraint, NCR VV ≥ , as:  
α
ππα )(2)(
NM
F −≡Ψ≤  .       (14) 
It is easy to see from (14) that )(αΨ  decreases in α.  As shown in Figure 1, )(αΓ and )(αΨ
intersect at 03 1 δα −≡  and )(2
NDF ππ −= .    
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In addition to IC1 and IC2, we also need to consider condition (9), which determines the 
boundary between the C/R equilibria and C/NR equilibria.  To determine the position of the 
)(αΦ curve relative to the )(αΨ curve, we compare (9) and (14) for α in the range ],0[ 3α .  
Figure 1 illustrates a situation where the )(αΦ curve lies below the )(αΨ  curve for all 
],0[ 3αα ∈ .  As shown in Appendix 2, a sufficient condition for this situation, i.e., )()( αα Ψ<Φ  
for all ),0( 3αα ∈ , is )2/(1 0δδ −≤ .  On the other hand, ifδ exceeds this threshold and ρ is 
sufficiently small, a portion of )(αΦ curve lies above the )(αΨ  curve for α  close to 3α .   
In the remainder of section IV (only), we will present the analysis under the assumption that 
)2/(1 0δδ −≤ .  We do so in order to keep at a manageable level the number of cases we have to 
discuss.  Interested readers are referred to Appendix A2.2 for an analysis of the cases associated 
with )2/(1 0δδ −> .     
To complete the derivation of a subgame perfect equilibrium in this case, we consider the 
firms’ decisions at stages 1 and 2 in the first period.  For a set of parameters such that (9), (12) 
and (14) hold, entering into a collusive agreement yields a higher payoff than competition.  
Hence, each firm has an incentive to be the instigator and to propose a collusive agreement at 
stage 1, and the other firm will have an incentive to agree to the agreement at stage 2.  
Accordingly, there are two symmetric subgame perfect equilibria associated in this case, one 
with firm 1 being the instigator and the other one with firm 2 being the instigator.20   
Note that (9) defines the boundary for the region over which a C/R equilibrium could occur.  
Below the )(αΦ  curve, firms would not reveal even if there is an investigation. Thus, this is the 
region for potential C/NR equilibria.  It can be shown that 0/ <∂Φ∂ ρ .  The latter implies that as 
                                                          
20 The same reasoning applies to the analysis of C/NR equilibria below.  Hence, it will not be repeated.   
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ρ falls, the )(αΦ curve in Figure 1 shifts upward, shrinking the region for potential C/R 
equilibria while enlarging the region for potential C/NR equilibria.     
On the other hand, note from (12) and (14) that )(αΓ  and )(αΨ  are independent of ρ . 
Thus, these two curves do not shift as the value of ρ changes.  
Therefore, the region for C/R equilibria is the shaded area bounded by the curves )(αΨ , 
)(αΓ  and )(αΦ  in Figure 1.  Define 2α  as the solution to )()( αα Φ=Γ .  Then we have the 
following observations about the C/R equilibria. 
Proposition 121: A C/R equilibrium is less strategically risky only if )(αΦ≥F .  Moreover,  
(i) if 2αα < , a C/R equilibrium occurs for )](),([ αα ΨΦ∈F , but there is no collusion for 
)(αΨ>F .  
(ii) if ),( 32 ααα ∈ , a C/R equilibrium occurs for )](),([ αα ΓΦ∈F , but there is no collusion for 
))(),(( αα ΓΦ∈F and )(αΨ>F . 
(iii) if 3αα > , there is no collusion for any )(αΦ>F . 
Proposition 1 suggests that a C/R equilibrium is not possible if the probability of 
investigation (α) is sufficiently high.  Note also that the effect of a larger fine (F) on collusion is 
not monotonic for α in the intermediate range between 2α  and 3α .  Here, there is no collusion if 
the fine is slightly less than )(αΓ , but an increase in the fine to between )(αΓ and )(αΨ will 
actually lead to collusion.  On the other hand, a further increase in the fine above )(αΨ  
eliminates collusion.  
 
                                                          
21 The proofs of all propositions and lemmas are presented in Appendix 2. 
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IV.4 The C/NR Equilibria 
Now we consider the case )(αΦ<F , i.e., in the region under the )(αΦ  curve in Figure 1.  In 
this case, Not Reveal is a less strategically risky strategy if there is an investigation by AA.  For 
a C/NR equilibrium to occur, the following to incentive compatibility conditions must be 
satisfied:  
(IC3) DCNR VV ≥ , and  
(IC4) NCNR VV ≥ .     
We will first consider IC4.  Using (6) and (11) we can show that it is satisfied if and only if  
αρ
ππ NMF −≤ .   (15) 
Moreover, using (9) we can find that )(αΦ<F   implies (15).  In other words,
 
NCNR VV ≥  is not 
a binding constraint given that )(αΦ<F . 
Turning to IC3, we use (6) and (10) to find that it holds if and only if 
 
)())(1(]2/)1()2/1([ MDNDF ππππαρδδδαρ −−−−≤−−− .   (16) 
Note that the left-hand side of (16) can be positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of 
α , δ  and ρ .  If it is positive (respectively, negative), (16) implies F < (respectively, >) )(αΩ , 
where  
           2/)1()2/1(
)())(1()(
δδαρ
ππππαρδα
−−−
−−−−
≡Ω
MDND
.         (17) 
Note that the left-hand side of (16), and hence the denominator of (17), is negative for all 
)1,0(∈α  if 
δ
δρ
−
−
<
2
1 .  On the other hand, the right-hand side of (16), and equivalently the 
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numerator of (17), is positive for all α  if 1αρ < .  Hence, 1α  and δ
δ
−
−
2
1  are the two critical 
values of ρ  that affect the sign of )(αΩ .   
The relative magnitudes of 1α  and δ
δ
−
−
2
1  depend on the value of δ.  It can be shown that 
δ
δα
−
−
<
2
1
1  if and only if 
0
0
1
2
δ
δ
δ
+
< .   Accordingly, the characteristics of C/NR equilibria 
depend on the magnitudes of δ and ρ.  
Let 4α  denote the positive root to the quadratic equation in α  implied by )()( αα Φ=Ω .  In 
other words, the )(αΩ curve and )(αΦ curve intercept at 4αα = .   Depending on the values of 
other parameters, 4α  may be less than or greater than 1.   Figure 2 illustrates a situation in which 
14 <α . 
Proposition 2:  A C/NR equilibrium is less strategically risky only if )(αΦ<F .  Moreover, 
(i) in the case where }
2
1,min{ 1 δ
δαρ
−
−
< , a C/NR equilibrium prevails for any value of )1,0(∈α  
as long as )(αΦ<F .  
(ii) in the case where 
0
0
1
2
δ
δ
δ
+
<  and 1αρ > , a C/NR equilibrium prevails if the amount of fine 
satisfies )}(,0max{)( αα Ω>>Φ F  for }1,min{ 4αα < .  There is no collusion if )(αΩ<F .   
(iii) in the case where 
0
0
1
2
δ
δ
δ
+
>  and
δ
δρ
−
−
>
2
1 , a C/NR equilibrium prevails if the amount of 
fine satisfies )}(),(min{ αα ΩΦ<F . 
Proposition 2 is better understood with the aid of Figures 1, 2 and 3.  Part (i) of the 
proposition says that if the probability of conviction (ρ) is low, a C/NR equilibrium prevails in 
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any point under the )(αΦ curve in Figure 1. In this case, the IC3 constraint is not binding given 
that )(αΦ<F .  Part (ii) of the proposition corresponds to the lower portion of Figure 2, where 
the )(αΩ curve is upward-sloping.  Figure 2 is drawn for a situation where only a portion of the 
)(αΩ  curve lies below the )(αΦ  curve.  However, for some smaller ρ (but still larger than 1α ), 
the )(αΩ  curve is everywhere below the )(αΦ curve for all )1,0(∈α .  Note that for α  between 
ρα /1  and 4α  in Figure 2, there is no collusion if F is small, but collusion occurs for a larger F.  
Looking at this from a slightly different perspective, Figure 2 shows that collusion can be 
deterred even if F is small, provided that both α and ρ are sufficiently large.  
Finally, part (iii) of the proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, where the )(αΩ curve is 
downward-sloping.   Here, the )(αΩ  curve (representing IC3) becomes a binding constraint for 
collusion if α is large enough.  Figure 3 is drawn for a situation where the )(αΩ curve hits the 
horizontal axis at α < 1.  However, for some smaller ρ (but still larger than 
δ
δ
−
−
2
1 ), the )(αΩ
curve lies above the horizontal axis for all )1,0(∈α .    
IV.5 Policy Implications  
A close examination of Propositions 1 and 2, along with Figures 1 – 3, reveals the impact of the 
three policy parameters, α, F and ρ, on firms’ incentives to collude and, in the event of 
investigation, to reveal.   First, a large probability of investigation (α) is quite effective in 
deterring collusion in the region where a C/R equilibrium may arise.  But it is not as effective in 
the region where a C/NR equilibrium may occur. If the probability of conviction is low, a large 
probability of investigation by itself may have no effect on collusion (see figure 1). To be 
effective, a large probability of investigation needs to be coupled with a large probability of 
conviction. 
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Second, a larger fine does not always reduce collusion. As has been noted above, if the 
probability of investigation falls in the interval ),( 32 αα or ),/( 41 αρα  in Figure 2, an increase in 
the fine can move the equilibrium from a region of no collusion into one of collusion. Intuitively, 
this possibility exists because the fine affects both the payoff from collusion and the payoff from 
defection.  It occurs when an increase in the amount of fine reduces the former by less than it 
reduces the latter, thus relaxing the relevant incentive compatibility constraint for collusion.  On 
the other hand, if we restrict ourselves to the regions where collusion occurs, revealing occurs 
only if the fine is sufficiently large, i.e., if )(αΦ≥F .  Therefore, if the goal of a leniency 
program is to encourage cartel members to come forward, a sufficiently large fine is needed to 
achieve this.    
Third and finally, a smaller probability of conviction reduces the occurrences of colluding 
and revealing (if investigated), but it increases the incidence of colluding and not revealing.  
Therefore, in a jurisdiction in which the bar for cartel conviction is very high, the leniency 
program may be less successful in inducing more revealing by firms.      
V.  Analysis of the Leniency Program with a NIIC 
Next we assume that a NIIC is attached to the leniency program.  Without loss of generality, 
much of our analysis will be conducted on the premise that firm 1 is the instigator of the cartel 
and as such is not eligible for leniency.  The analysis is symmetric for the case where firm 2 is 
the instigator of the cartel.  It can be shown that in situations where collusion occurs, there are 
two subgame perfect equilibria, one with firm 1 as the instigator and the other with firm 2 as the 
instigator.  
We will use “^” to indicate the variables and parameters associated with the NIIC regime.   
Because they are treated differently under the NIIC regime, the payoffs from collusion are 
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different for the two firms.  Accordingly, we define CiVˆ as firm i’s expected payoff in a collusive 
equilibrium, and DiVˆ  as firm i’s expected payoff from defection.   The payoff from competition, 
however, remains the same as given by (6). 
The procedure we use to determine the equilibria in this case is the same as in section IV.  To 
speed the exposition here we relegate the detailed analysis of this case to Appendix 1.  We 
present below a summary of this analysis.    
1. Since the firms are asymmetric in this case, we must consider a pair of incentive 
compatibility constraints for each of IC1, IC2, and IC3.  In each case, only one of each 
pair of constraints will be binding.    
2. The first incentive compatibility constraint, which we called IC1 and which related to the 
choice between C/R and defecting, is tighter for firm 2 (the non-instigator) than for firm 1.  
We name this constraint of firm 2 as IC1′ and label its curve Γˆ . 
3.  The second incentive compatibility constraint, IC2, which related to the choice between  
C/R  and playing non-cooperatively (i.e. Nash), is tighter for firm 1 (the instigator) than 
for firm 2.  This constraint of firm 1 (now denoted by IC2′) defines the curve Ψˆ . 
4. The third incentive constraint, IC3, related to the choice between C/NR and defecting, is 
tighter for firm 2 than for firm 1.  This constraint of firm 2 is now referred to as IC3′ and 
its curve as Ωˆ .22 
5. In the revelation subgame at stage 5, Not Reveal becomes a dominant (at least weakly) 
strategy for the instigator (since it gains nothing from revealing).  Given our assumption 
that the firms will play (weakly) dominant strategies, we obtain a unique equilibrium in 
this subgame.  This means we do not need to use the strategic riskiness selection criterion 
                                                          
22 As before, incentive compatibility constraint IC4 is redundant.   
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to identify an equilibrium outcome.  Because of this change, the boundary between C/R 
and C/NR equilibria regions (previously Φ) will move upward to become Φˆ  (as will be 
elaborated below in Lemma 2). 
 
To determine the effects of the NIIC on equilibria, we compare the equilibrium conditions 
with and without the clause.  We will proceed by first examining how the NIIC affects the 
incentive compatibility conditions for collusion, represented by functions ΓΨΩΓΨ ˆ,ˆ,,,  and Ωˆ .  
Then we consider how the NIIC changes the boundary conditions that separate the C/R equilibria 
from the C/NR equilibria, represented by functions Φ  and Φˆ .   Finally, we combine the two to 
show that the NIIC can expand the set of parameter values over which collusion can arise (which 
we will refer to for simplicity as “increasing collusion”) under some circumstances.  
The incentive compatibility conditions are based on comparisons of the firms’ payoffs under 
collusion, defection, and competition.  Note that the NIIC has no impact on the payoff from 
competition (VN) and the payoff in a C/NR equilibrium (VCNR).  Moreover, it can be shown that 
CRCRCR VVV 21 ˆˆ << and 
DDD VVV 21 ˆˆ << .  Thus, for firm 1 (the instigator) the NIIC reduces both 
the payoff from collusion (in a C/R equilibrium) and the payoff from defection.  In other words, 
while the NIIC reduces the instigator’s incentive to enter into a collusive agreement, it also 
decreases the firm’s incentive to defect in the event of collusion.  On the other hand, the NIIC 
increases the payoff from collusion (in a C/R equilibrium) for firm 2, but it also enhances its 
incentives to defect and reveal.  On the surface, it is not obvious whether the NIIC tightens or 
relaxes these incentive compatibility constraints.   
A more careful comparison of the incentive compatibility conditions under the two regimes 
reveals that NIIC tightens these constraints.  To present this formally, define a pair of sets,
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)}()(|)1,0(),{( ααα Γ≥≥Ψ×∈≡ + FRFS  and }ˆ),(ˆ|)1,0(),{(ˆ Γ≤Ψ≤×∈≡ + ααα FRFS , for 
potential  C/R equilibria.  The former is the set of ),( Fα  that satisfies the incentive compatibility 
constraint associated with a C/R equilibrium, IC1 and IC2, while the latter is the set of ),( Fα  
that satisfies the counterparts under the NIIC regime, IC1' and IC2'.   Similarly, we can define 
another pair of sets for potential C/NR equilibria, )}(|)1,0(),{( αα Ω≤×∈≡ + kkFRFT  where 
2/)1()2/1( δδαρ −−−=k , and )}(ˆ|)1,0(),{(ˆ αα Ω≤×∈≡ + FRFT .
23  Set T is the collection 
of ),( Fα  that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint associated with a C/NR equilibrium, 
IC3, and Tˆ is the set of ),( Fα  that satisfies the counterpart under the NIIC regime, IC3'.    
Lemma 1: Sˆ  is a strict subset of S, and Tˆ  is a strict subset of T.  
Lemma 1 states that the set of ),( Fα  that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints for 
collusion under the NIIC regime is smaller than that under the leniency program without a NIIC.  
This seems to suggest that the NIIC should indeed achieve its intended effect of decreasing 
collusion.  Given that the NIIC tightens the incentive compatibility constraints for collusion in 
both the C/R and C/NR equilibria, one might expect the NIIC should reduce the occurrence of 
collusion.   
However, an analysis of the boundary conditions (Φ  and Φˆ ) indicates that the above 
intuition is incomplete.  By denying leniency for the cartel instigator, the NIIC removes its 
incentives to reveal.  This, in turn, makes the cartel more stable and hence more valuable to the 
instigator and the non-instigator, reducing the latter’s incentives to reveal. This shifts the 
boundary between C/R and C/NR equilibria.  Indeed, using (9) and (28), we can show: 
                                                          
23 We use this k term to control for the switching of signs that determines whether Ω is a positively or negatively 
sloped function of α.  See equations (15) and (16) and accompanying discussion. 
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Lemma 2: )()(ˆ αα Φ>Φ  for all ]1,0[∈α .   
Lemma 2 suggests that, given that collusion has occurred, the NIIC enlarges the set of ),( Fα  
over which the C/NR equilibrium prevails.  In other words, while cartels may be less likely to 
occur under the NIIC, firms are less likely to reveal when a cartel does happen.    
A less obvious implication of the boundary shift is that it can enlarge the set of ),( Fα  for 
which collusion occurs.  Indeed, with the aid of Lemmas 1 and 2, we can establish the following: 
Proposition 3:  The NIIC reduces collusion if )(ˆ αΦ≥F .  It does not increase collusion (i.e. 
increase the range over which collusion is sustainable) if )(αΦ≤F .  However, if F is in the 
intermediate range, then the NIIC may expand the set of parameter values over which collusion 
is sustainable and, in situations where collusion prevails with and without the NIIC, it reduces 
revelation.  
Figures 4 and 5 are examples that illustrate Proposition 3.  Figure 4 is drawn under the 
conditions that 
δδ
δδρ
+−
−
<
)1(2 0
0   and 
2
1
≤δ .      (18) 
It can be viewed as a combination of Figure 1 and the figure that would arise from the same 
parameter conditions under the NICC, for example this considers a case of a sufficiently small ρ.  
In the diagram, area A represents those combinations of ),( Fα with which collusion does not 
occur under the leniency program without a NIIC but does arise under the NIIC regime.  Note 
that this area lies between the curves )(αΦ and )(ˆ αΦ .  Also lying between these two curves is 
area B, in which the NIIC turns C/R equilibria into C/NR equilibria.  Here, the NIIC does not 
induce more collusion but it reduces the occurrence of revealing.  Located above the )(ˆ αΦ curve 
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is area C, which represents the reduction in collusion as a result of the NIIC.  Finally, the NIIC 
does not increase or decrease collusion in the area under the )(αΦ  curve in Figure 4.   
This last observation, however, is tied to the conditions in (18).  Figure 5 illustrates an 
example that can arise under a different set of conditions.24  Below the )(αΦ curve in this 
diagram, area D represents the reduction in collusion as a result of the NIIC.  On the other hand, 
areas A, B, and C represent the same effects of the NIIC as their counterparts in Figure 4.      
More generally, we can derive the following condition for the NIIC to increase collusion.   
Proposition 4:  The NIIC increase collusion for ))(ˆ),(( αα ΦΦ∈F  if  
0
0
32 δδ
δδ
ρ
−+
−
< .       (19) 
It is important to note that condition (19) permits a fairly wide range of ρ .25  The critical 
value of ρ  given by the right-hand side of (19) can, for δ  and 0δ  in the appropriate ranges, be 
greater than the critical values of ρ  contained in Proposition 2, namely 1α  and )2/()1( δδ −− .  
In other words, Propositions 4 is relevant for all three cases in Proposition 2.  Figures 6 and 7 are 
just two examples of the cases that can arise when condition (19) is satisfied.   
Finally, it is also worth noting that condition (19) is sufficient, but not necessary, for the 
NIIC to increase collusion for F in the region ))(ˆ),(( αα ΦΦ .  In other words, the NIIC may 
increase collusion even if ρ  exceeds the threshold given in (19).   
 
                                                          
24 To be precise, the conditions for Figure 5   to arise are 4/)177(0 −>δ , ))2/(1,/)1(2( 000 δδδδ −−∈ , and 
))1)(2/()(,( 001 δδδδαρ −+−∈ .  See Appendix 2 for the derivation of these conditions and (18).   
25 Note also that Proposition 4 is not subject to the assumption )2/(1 0δδ −≤  in section IV.     
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VI. Asymmetric Firms 
In this section, we extend our model to allow firms to be asymmetric in their own right.  
Specifically, we suppose that, because of differences on the cost and/or demand side, the one-
period profit from collusion, defection, or competition is different for different firms.  
Accordingly, the one-period profit from each of these actions is denoted by Miπ , 
D
iπ , and 
N
iπ , 
where the subscript denotes firm i (= 1, 2).  Define )/()(0
N
i
D
i
M
i
D
ii ππππδ −−= , and assume 
that the firms’ common discount factor δ satisfies },max{ 0201 δδδ > , so that collusion can be 
supported in the absence of antitrust enforcement.  Following the same procedure as in previous 
sections, we can use the firms’ incentive compatibility constraints and the boundary conditions to 
derive )(αiΓ , )(αiΨ , )(αiΩ , )(αiΦ , iΓˆ , )(ˆ αiΨ , )(ˆ αiΩ , and )(ˆ αiΦ  for each firm i.   
The main point we want to make with this extended model is that when firms are asymmetric, 
the NIIC can have an additional adverse effect on competition.  We will make this point by 
focusing on the case of C/NR equilibria only.  This will allow us to make our point clearly and 
effectively without being distracted by the discussions of the myriad of scenarios that arise in 
this extended model.  Since, from (9) and Lemma 2, we know that 0)(' <Φ αi  and 
)()(ˆ αα ii Φ>Φ  for ]1,0[∈α , we accomplish this by assuming that )}1(),1(min{ 21 ΦΦ<F .  To 
reduce further the number of scenarios we must discuss, we assume that 
},min{ 2211
NDNDF ππππ −−< .  This assumption ensures that, under the NIIC regime, the 
instigator’s payoff from defection is higher than that from competition.  Combining these 
assumptions, we will focus on the equilibria for F fixed at a value in the range 
},),1(),1(min{ 221121
NDNDF ππππ −−ΦΦ< .   
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We start with the leniency program without a NIIC.  With asymmetric firms, the incentive 
compatibility constraint, IC3, is different for different firms.  Using firm i’s counterpart to (16), 
we find that IC3 for firm i is equivalent to 
                          
])2/1()([
2/)1()()(
F
F
N
i
D
i
M
i
D
i
N
i
D
i
Ci δππδρ
δππππδ
αα
−+−
−+−−−
≡≤ .   (20) 
Similarly, we can derive the IC3' for the non-instigator (indicated by superscript NI) under 
the NIIC as: 
                                        
])([
)()(ˆ
FNi
D
i
M
i
D
i
N
i
D
iNI
Ci +−
−−−
≡≤
ππδρ
ππππδ
αα .    (21) 
With asymmetric firms, it is no longer the case that the incentive compatibility constraint of the 
non-instigator necessarily implies that of the instigator.  Thus, we use firm i’s counterpart to (5) 
to derive its incentive compatibility constraint for collusion as an instigator (indicated by 
superscript I):  
                                   
])1()([
)1()()(ˆ
F
F
N
i
D
i
M
i
D
i
N
i
D
iI
Ci δππδρ
δππππδ
αα
−+−
−+−−−
≡≤ .    (22) 
Notice that the critical values given in (20) – (22) can all exceed 1 for a sufficiently small ρ.  
In that case, collusion would occur for all values of )1,0(∈α , and the presence or absence of the 
NIIC would not make any difference.26  Given that our interest here is to study the effect of the 
NIIC, we rule out this scenario by assuming that δδρ /1 0i−>  for i = 1 and 2.  This assumption 
ensures that each of (20) and (21) becomes binding for at least some )1,0(∈α .  
The relative magnitudes of these critical values of α can be ranked as follows. 
Lemma 3:  NICiCi
I
Ci ααα ˆˆ >> .   
                                                          
26 We need to keep in mind that our analysis here is confined to the region of potential C/NR equilibria.  The NIIC 
would make a difference if we broaden the range of F to bring in C/R equilibria.   
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Lemma 3 suggests that for a given firm, the NIIC tightens the incentive compatibility 
constraint if it is a non-instigator but relaxes it if it is an instigator.  This by itself, however, is not 
sufficient to ensure that the NIIC would reduce collusion.  To the contrary, the NIIC may 
increase collusion, as we will show below. 
To simplify the discussion of the equilibria in this extended model, we assume, without loss 
of generality, that 21 CC αα < .  We will first present the conditions under which a C/NR 
equilibrium occurs with and without the NIIC.  This lays the foundation for deriving the 
condition under which the NIIC increases collusion.      
Proposition 5:  Given the assumptions in this section,  
(i) A C/NR equilibrium prevails under the leniency program without NIIC if 1Cαα ≤ .   
(ii) A C/NR equilibrium prevails under the NIIC regime if { }NICNICIC 121 ˆ},ˆ,ˆmin{max αααα ≤ .  
Part (i) of Proposition 5 says that firm 1 is the marginal firm that determines the critical value 
of α for collusion in the absence of the NIIC.  Part (ii) of the proposition, however, implies that 
firm 1 is not necessarily the marginal firm under the NIIC regime.  Recall that in our model the 
identity of the instigator is determined endogenously at stages 1 and 2 in the first period of the 
game.  If a collusive agreement instigated by firm i yields higher payoffs than competition for 
both firms, firm i will have an incentive to propose such an agreement at stage 1 and the other 
firm will accept it.  Note that firm i’s incentive to be an instigator is independent of whether the 
other firm 2 wants to instigate a cartel.  Therefore, the critical value of α for collusion is the 
larger of the two critical values associated with each of the two firms being the instigator.  The 
critical value of α for collusion is }ˆ,ˆmin{ 21
NI
C
I
C ααα <  if firm 1 is the instigator.  On the other 
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hand, if firm 2 is the instigator, the critical value is NIC1αˆ , (which is smaller than 
I
C 2αˆ  by Lemma 
3).   
Proposition 5 implies that the NIIC will increase collusion if 
{ } .ˆ},ˆ,ˆmin{max 1121 CNICNICIC αααα >   This can indeed arise uncertain circumstances.    
Proposition 6:  Given the assumptions in this section, the NIIC increases collusion if and only if 
12ˆ C
NI
C αα > . 
27  
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the two situations implied by Proposition 6.  Under the NIIC regime, 
either firm can be an instigator in equilibrium if NIC1αˆα < , but collusion is possible only with firm 
1 as the instigator if NIC1αˆα > .   In latter case, the critical value of α for collusion is given by 
}ˆ,ˆmin{ 21
NI
C
I
C αα .  Figure 6 illustrates a situation where 
I
C
NI
C 12 ˆˆ αα < , in which case firm 2 is the 
marginal firm that determines the critical value of α under the NIIC regime.  Figure 7, on the 
other hand, demonstrates a situation where IC
NI
C 12 ˆˆ αα > , in which case firm 1 is the marginal firm 
under the NIIC regime.     
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
From earlier research, notably that of Motto-Polo (2003) we already knew that leniency 
programs can have unintended effects, in that they can actually enhance cartel stability under 
certain conditions.  This paper extends this earlier work, most significantly by considering the 
implications of layering a policy of denying leniency to instigators or whistleblowers on top of a 
more standard leniency program.   
                                                          
27 From (20)-(21) it is not difficult to see that parameter values exist such that this condition can hold. 
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The results here suggest first that, the NIIC does have the effect of tightening incentive 
compatibility constraints around decisions to collude or defect – an effect that would, by itself 
tend to be pro-competitive.  However, the policy also reduced the incentive parties have to reveal 
collusive activity to the antitrust authority, with two important implications:  (i) collusion may be 
supportable under parameter conditions that would not have supported collusion without the 
NIIC; and (ii) regions in the parameter space in which collusion would have been revealed after 
the start of an investigation will, with a NIIC, become regions with collusion but no revealing.  It 
is also true that there can be regions in which the NIIC can successfully deter instigation in the 
first place, so that collusion is not supportable that would have arisen absent the NIIC. 
In our model, firms’ opportunity to reveal comes after an investigation has been launched.  
As noted in section III, some models in the leniency literature have featured different timing in 
which revealing can happen as a firm defects from the cartel agreement.  In Appendix 3 we 
modify our model’s timing in this way and show that – even though we will no longer observe 
revealing in equilibrium – our other key result carries over.  Specifically, we show that the NIIC 
can increase collusion for some parameter values. 
Clearly, the wide variety of potential results makes drawing firm policy conclusions on the 
wisdom of including such clauses difficult.  Perhaps the best that can be said is that it is very 
hard to make a strong policy case for including NIICs based on the deterrence or detection of 
cartels at this point.28  It also suggests that further work would be very valuable.  We could, for 
example, incorporate asymmetry into the larger model studied here, though we do not expect that 
to change our qualitative conclusions much.  More promisingly, we could explore the 
implication of less complete leniency policies and partial NIICs and we could optimize public 
                                                          
28 It may be the case that some NIICs were motivated by a moral distaste for granting leniency to the most culpable 
of cartel members, rather than a careful consideration of the efficiency effects of the policy.   
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policy with respect to these instruments.  It would also be very useful, as an important robustness 
check, to consider more than two firms in the cartel:  with only two firms and a NIIC in place, 
the non-instigator need not fear a “rush to the courthouse” and so might behave in a qualitatively 
different way than it would were it to be one of several non-instigators.  Finally, another 
modeling assumption that could be usefully explored was that once ended collusion can never be 
restarted.  As with some other papers in the leniency literature we might consider the 
implications of letting the cartel restart (after detection and punishment, but not after defection) 
after some number of periods.   
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Appendix 1:  Detailed Analysis of the NIIC Case 
In this appendix, we present the complete analysis of the equilibrium under the assumption that a 
NIIC is attached to the leniency program.  We will proceed in the same order as in section IV.   
A1.1 The Revelation Game at Stage 5 
As in section IV, we start with an examination of each firm’s incentives to reveal at stage 5 in 
period t.  If neither firm defects at stage 3, the firms face the situation at stage 5 as represented by 
Table A1-1. 
Table A1-1: The Revelation Game at Stage 5 in the case where neither firm has defected 
              Firm 2 
Firm 1 
Reveal Not reveal 
Reveal 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹, 𝜋𝑀 +  𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,  𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
Not reveal 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,   𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝑀 + 𝜌� � 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹�+ (1 − 𝜌�)𝛿𝑉�1𝐶 ,   
𝜋𝑀 +  𝜌� � 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹� + (1 − 𝜌�)𝛿𝑉�2𝐶  
 
In the subgame represented by Table A1-1, Not Reveal is a weakly dominant strategy for 
firm 1 (the instigator) since the NIIC removes the incentives for the firm to reveal.   Then (Not 
Reveal, Not Reveal) will be a Nash equilibrium in this subgame if firm 2 does not have an 
incentive to reveal, i.e., if    
                         
δ
δππδρ
δ
δπρπ
−
+≥−+



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
−
−
+
1
ˆ)~1(
1
~
2
N
MC
N
M VF .    (A1) 
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Note that (A1) is the same as (1) except that CV is now replaced by CV2ˆ .   Accordingly, we can 
substitute CV2ˆ  for 
CV in (2) to obtain the critical value of ρ~ that determines firm 2’s choice 
between Reveal and Not Reveal, denoted by *ρˆ .  
Note an important difference that NIIC makes to the equilibrium outcome in this subgame.  
Given that firm 1 never chooses Reveal (because it is weakly dominated), the strategy profile 
(Reveal, Reveal) is not an equilibrium outcome if *ρˆρ < .  Accordingly, we no longer need to 
use strategic riskiness to select an equilibrium outcome.        
From (2) it is easy to see that 0*ˆ >ρ  as long as )1/(2ˆ δπ −≥
NCV  (collusion yields a higher 
payoff than competition).  This implies that along any equilibrium path, neither firm will reveal 
in the event that AA does not launch an investigation ( 0~ =ρ ) in period t.   On the other hand, in 
the event that there is an investigation ( ρρ =~ ), firm 2 will reveal if and only if *ρˆρ > .   
Therefore, a C/NR equilibrium could occur if *ρˆρ < , and a C/R equilibrium could prevail if ρ >
*ρˆ .  
Table A1-2: The Revelation Game at Stage 5 in the case where firm 1 has defected 
              Firm 2 
Firm 1 
Reveal Not reveal 
Reveal 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹, 𝜋𝑆 +  𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,  𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
Not reveal 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,   𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝜌�𝐹,    𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝜌�𝐹 
 
To find a firm’s payoff from defection, consider the situation in Table A1-2, which 
represents the subgame after firm 1 has defected.   We can see from Table A1-2 that Reveal is a 
strictly dominant strategy for firm 2 if ρρ =~ .  If 0~ =ρ , on the other hand, Reveal is a weakly 
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dominant strategy for firm 2.  Under our assumption that a firm chooses a dominant strategy 
whenever there is one, firm 2 chooses Reveal in the subgame represented by Table A1-2.  Given 
that firm 2 chooses Reveal, firm 1 is indifferent between Reveal and Not Reveal.   In fact, the 
payoffs for the two firms are the same between (Reveal, Reveal) and (Not Reveal, Reveal).   
Hence, we can select either of these as the equilibrium outcome in this subgame.    
We can construct another table like Table A1-2 for the case where firm 2 has defected at 
stage 3.  Applying the same logic as in the preceding paragraph, the relevant equilibria in this 
stage game are (Reveal, Reveal) and (Not Reveal, Reveal), both yield the same payoffs to the 
two firms.  
A1.2 The C/R Equilibria under the NIIC Regime 
We first consider the C/R equilibria, which could arise if *ρˆρ > .  In this case, the equilibrium 
strategy profile played in the subgame game represented by Table A1-1 is (Not Reveal, Reveal) 
if there is an investigation and (Not Reveal, Not Reveal) if there is no investigation.  Then at 
stage 3, the cartel instigator’s expected payoff, if it chooses to honor the collusive agreement, is 
given by  
                                  


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1
ˆ)1(ˆ 11
 
.  (A2) 
Solving (A2) to obtain: 
δα
αδαδππ
)1(1
)1/(
1ˆ −−
−−+
=
FV
NM
CR .    (A3) 
Similarly, firm 2’s expected payoff, if it chooses to stick with the collusive agreement, is given 
by  
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Solving (A4) to obtain: 
δα
δαδππ
)1(1
)1/(
2ˆ −−
−+
=
NM
CRV .      (A5) 
If firm i chooses to defect from the collusive agreement, its expected payoff is  
FV
N
DD −
−
+=
δ
δππ
11ˆ
  (A6) 
for the cartel instigator, and  
δ
δππ
−
+=
12ˆ
N
DDV         (A7) 
for the other firm.   
It is easy to see from (4), (10), (A3), and (A5) – (A7) that CRCRCR VVV 21 ˆˆ <<  and 
DDD VVV 21 ˆˆ << .   In other words, the NIIC reduces firm 1’s payoff and raises firm 2’s payoff in 
both the case where a firm chooses to honor the collusive agreement and the case where it 
defects from the agreement.   
Since the payoffs of these two firms are no longer symmetric under the NIIC regime, we 
must consider two pairs of the incentive compatibility constraints for collusion, one pair for each 
firm.  They are:  DCR VV 11 ˆˆ ≥  and 
NCR VV ≥1ˆ  for firm 1, and 
DCR VV 22 ˆˆ ≥  and 
NCR VV ≥2ˆ  for firm 2.  
It is easier to consider first the incentive compatibility constraints of firm 2.  Since ND ππ > , 
it is clear from (11) and (A7) that ND VV >2ˆ .  Thus, the binding incentive compatibility constraint 
for firm 2 is DCR VV 22 ˆˆ ≥ , which, for ease of comparison with section IV, will be named IC1′.  
Using (A5) and (A7) we rewrite the condition   DCR VV 22 ˆˆ ≥ as:  
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1
01 α
δ
δα ≡−≤ .    (A8) 
In the F−α  space, (A8) represents all the points to the left of the vertical line at 1αα = , which 
is named as the Γˆ  curve in Figure A1-1.  
For firm 1, on the other hand, ND VV >1ˆ  if and only if 
NDF ππ −< .  Therefore, the binding 
incentive compatibility condition for firm 1 to enter into a collusive agreement is DCR VV 11 ˆˆ ≥  for 
NDF ππ −≤ , and NCR VV 11 ˆˆ ≥  for 
NDF ππ −> .   It can be shown, using (A3), (A5) – (A7), that 
DCR VV 22 ˆˆ ≥  implies 
DCR VV 11 ˆˆ ≥ .  Thus, the condition 
DCR VV 22 ≥  determines the boundary for 
collusion in the case NDF ππ −≤ .   
    Now consider the case )( NDF ππ −> .
 
 Here firm 1’s incentive compatibility constraint is  
NCR VV ≥1ˆ , which is the counterpart to IC2 in section IV and will be named as IC2′.  Using (6) 
and (A3) we can rewrite it as:  
α
ππα )()(ˆ
NM
F −≡Ψ≤ .    (A9) 
It is easy to see from (A9) that )(ˆ αΨ  decreases in 𝛼.   
Next, we consider the boundary condition that separates the region of potential C/R equilibria 
and that of the potential C/NR equilibria.  Substituting (A5) into for CV  in (2), we derive  
FNM
NM
)1()(
)(ˆ *
αδδππδ
ππδ
ρ
+−+−
−
= .    (A10) 
It is clear from (A10) that *ρˆ  > 0.   Moreover, it can be shown *ρˆρ ≥  if and only if  
ραδδ
ππρδα
)1(
))(1()(ˆ
+−
−−
≡Φ≥
NM
F .    (A11) 
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It can be verified from (A11) that )(ˆ αΦ  decreases in 𝛼.   
In Figures A1-1 and A1-2, )(ˆ αΦ  defines the boundary between the C/R region and C/NR 
region.  It can be shown that 0/ˆ <∂Φ∂ ρ .  It implies that as ρ falls, the )(ˆ αΦ curve in these two 
diagrams shifts upward, shrinking the region of C/R equilibria while enlarging the region of 
potential C/NR equilibria.29  Figure A1-1 is drawn under the assumption that 
0
0
21 δδ
δδρ
−+
−
> , in 
which case the )(ˆ αΦ  curve lies below the )(ˆ αΨ  curve for all 1αα ≤ . Figure A1-2, on the other 
hand, is drawn for 
0
0
21 δδ
δδ
ρ
−+
−
< , in which case the )(ˆ αΦ  curve crosses the )(ˆ αΨ  curve at an 
1αα < .  In both diagrams, the shaded area above the )(ˆ αΦ  curve is the region over which a C/R 
equilibrium occurs.  
A1.3 The C/NR Equilibria under the NIIC Regime 
Now consider the case *ρˆρ < , or equivalently )(ˆ αΦ<F .  In this case, the equilibrium strategy 
profile played in the subgame represented by Table A1-1 is (Not Reveal, Not Reveal) for both 
values of ρ~ .  Since neither firm ever chooses to reveal, the NIIC has no effect on each firm’s 
payoff in this situation.  Hence, each firm’s payoff remains the same as VCNR, given by (6). 
In this case, there are three incentive compatibility constraints, namely, DCNR VV 1ˆ≥ , 
DCNR VV 2ˆ≥  and 
NCNR VV ≥ .  However, two of these constraints are not binding.  To be more 
specific, DCNR VV 1ˆ≥  is implied by 
DCNR VV 2ˆ≥  because 
DD VV 21 ˆˆ < .  Moreover, since 
ND VV >2ˆ , 
                                                          
29 Note from (A8) and (A9) that Γˆ  and )(ˆ αΨ  are independent of ρ .  Thus, in Figures A1-1 and A1-2 these two 
curves do not shift as the value of ρ  changes. 
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DCNR VV 2ˆ≥  also implies that 
NCNR VV > .  Therefore, the only binding constraint we need to 
consider is DCNR VV 2ˆ≥ , which we will call IC3′.   
Using (6) and (A7), we rewrite IC3′ as  
αρ
ππππδαρα )()()1()(ˆ
MDND
F −−−−=Ω≤ .     (A12) 
It can be shown that Ωˆ  decreases in 𝛼 and ρ .  Accordingly, )(ˆ αΩ  is a downward-sloping 
curve in Figures A1-1 and A1-2.  A fall in ρ  would shift the curve upward.   Moreover, it can be 
verified that )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Φ=Ω  at 1αα = , and )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Φ>Ω  if and only if 1αα < .  In the latter case, 
(A12) is not binding.  Therefore, the )(ˆ αΩ  curve determines the boundary of collusion only for 
1αα > , as shown in Figures A1-1 and A1-2.  
A1.4 Properties of the Equilibria  
To complete the analysis of the equilibria under the NIIC regime, we consider the firms’ choices 
at stages 1 and 2 in the first period of the game.  If conditions IC1' and IC2' are satisfied in the 
case )(ˆ αΦ≥F , or if IC3' is satisfied in the case )(ˆ αΦ<F , entering into a collusive agreement 
yields a higher payoff to each firm than competition.  Even though the instigator earns a lower 
payoff than the non-instigator, it is still the best response of a firm to propose a collusive 
agreement at stage 1 if it expects that the other firm will not propose.  Therefore, there are two 
subgame perfect equilibria, one with firm 1 being the instigator and the other with firm 2 being 
the instigator.   (In the following discussion, however, we will continue to focus on the case 
where firm 1 is the instigator).    
From the proceeding analysis, we can summarize the conditions for the equilibria under the 
NIIC Regime as follows. 
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Proposition A1:  (i) A C/R equilibrium occurs if )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Φ≥≥Ψ F .  The latter can be satisfied 
only if 1αα ≤ . 
(ii) A C/NR equilibrium occurs if )(ˆ αΦ<F  for 1αα ≤ , or if )(ˆ αΩ<F  for 1αα > .   
(iii) No collusion occurs in equilibrium if )}(ˆ),(ˆmax{ αα ΦΨ>F  for 1αα ≤ , or if )(ˆ αΩ>F  
for 1αα > . 
Recall that Figures A1-1 and A1-2 are drawn for different ranges of 𝜌.  If 
)21/()( 00 δδδδρ −+−> ,  the Γˆ curve, which comes from firm 2’s incentive compatibility 
condition in a C/R equilibrium,  determines part of the boundary between collusion and no 
collusion (see Figure A1-1).  If )21/()( 00 δδδδρ −+−< , on the other hand, this segment of the 
Γˆ curve is submerged in the region of C/NR equilibria, and as such is no longer relevant.  Instead, 
the )(ˆ αΦ  curve determines part of the boundary between collusion and no collusion (see Figure 
A1-2).    
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Appendix 2:  Proofs 
A2.1. Proof of the Sufficient Condition for )()( αα Ψ<Φ  for all ],0( 3αα ∈  
Using (9) and (14), we find that )()( αα Ψ<Φ  if and only if   
0)1)(12()14()( >−++−≡ δρραδαH .   (A13) 
It is easy to show that 0)(' ≥αH  if and only if 4/1≥ρ .  Since 0)1)(12()0( >−+= δρH , 
(A13) holds for any value of 𝛼 and 𝛿 between 0 and 1 if 4/1≥ρ .  For the case 4/1<ρ , we use 
(A13) to show that 0)( 3 ≥αH  at 0=ρ  if )2/(1 0δδ −≤ .  Since 0/)( >∂∂ ραH , we have 
0)( 3 >αH  for any 0>ρ  under the same condition.  Given that 0)(' <αH  for 4/1<ρ , the 
condition )2/(1 0δδ −≤  is sufficient to ensure that 0)( >αH  and hence )()( αα Ψ<Φ  for 
],0( 3αα ∈ .  
A2.2. Analysis of C/R Equilibrium under the Assumption )2/(1 0δδ −>  
The preceding discussion implies that )2/(1 0δδ −≤  is a sufficient, but not a necessary, 
condition for )()( αα Ψ<Φ  to hold in the range ],0( 3αα ∈ .  Using (A13) we find that 
0)( 3 >αH  if and only if  
0
0
422
1)2(
δδδ
δδ
ρ
−+
−−
> .   (A14) 
Note that the right-hand side of (A14) is positive if and only if )2/(1 0δδ −> .   
Suppose )2/(1 0δδ −> .  We still have )()( αα Ψ<Φ  as long as the value of 𝜌 satisfies 
(A14).  In other words, all of the results in section IV are still valid as long as (A14) holds.  On 
the other hand, in the case where (A14) is violated, we have )()( αα Ψ>Φ  for α  close to 3α .  
Then in Figures 1 – 3, the )(αΦ curve lies above the )(αΓ  curve for 3αα ≤ , which implies that 
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the )(αΓ  curve no longer determines the boundary between C/R equilibria and no collusion.  
Define 2α  as the solution to )()( αα Ψ=Φ .  Part (i) of Proposition 1 is applicable for 2αα < , 
and part (iii) is applicable for 2αα > .  Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is no longer relevant.  
A2.3. Conditions for Figures 4 and 5 to Arise 
In Figure 4, we have )()(ˆ αα Ψ>Ω  and )()( αα Φ>Ψ  for ]1,[ 1αα ∈ .  Using (14) and (A12), we 
find that )()(ˆ αα Ψ>Ω  holds for 1≤α  if 
δδ
δδ
ρ
+−
−
<
)1(2 0
0 .    (A15) 
Using (A13) we show that a sufficient condition for )()( αα Φ>Ψ  to hold for 1≤α  is 2/1≤δ .  
Moreover, we need to ensure that ρ satisfies the condition in part (i) of Proposition 2, which is 
associated with the equilibrium scenarios illustrated in Figure 4.  In this regard, observe that  
δδ
δδ
δδ
δδ
α
δ
δ
+−
−
=



+−
−



−
−
)1(2)1(2
,,
2
1min
0
0
0
0
1   (A16) 
for 2/1≤δ .  Hence, (18) is sufficient for the situation in Figure 4 to arise.  
In Figure 5, )()( αα Ψ<Φ  for ],0( 3αα ∈  and )()(ˆ αα Ψ>Ω  for ),( 31 ααα ∈ .  As shown 
above in section A2.1, the former holds if )2/(1 0δδ −< .  Using (14) and (A12), we find that the 
latter is satisfied as long as  
)1)(2( 0
0
δδ
δδ
ρ
−+
−
< .     (A17) 
Note that in Figure 5, the equilibrium scenarios without the NIIC are associated with part (ii) of 
Proposition 2, which arises if 1αρ >  and )1/(2 00 δδδ +< .   It can be shown that 
)1)(2/()( 001 δδδδα −+−<   if and only if 00 /)1(2 δδδ −> .  Moreover, we need  
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4/)177(0 −>δ  to ensure that )2/(1/)1(2 000 δδδ −<− .  This restriction on 0δ  also implies 
that )1/(2)2/(1 000 δδδ +<− .  Therefore, 4/)177(0 −>δ , ))2/(1,/)1(2( 000 δδδδ −−∈  and 
))1)(2/()(,( 001 δδδδαρ −+−∈  are sufficient for the situation in Figure 5 to arise.  
A2.4. Proof of Propositions and Lemmas 
Proof of Proposition 1: From (7) – (9) we know that a C/R equilibrium is less risky if )(αΦ≥F .  
Under the assumption that )2/(1 0δδ −≤ , the )(αΦ  curve lies below the )(αΨ  curve for all 
],0( 3αα ∈ .  Then the )(αΨ  curve determines the boundary between C/R equilibria and no 
collusion for )()( 33 αα Γ=Ψ≥F , and the )(αΓ  curve determines the same boundary for 
)](),([ 32 αα ΓΓ∈F .  Since  0)(' <Ψ α , 0)(' >Γ α  and 0)(' <Φ α , we have the results in parts 
(i), (ii) and (iii).  QED 
Proof of Proposition 2: From (7) – (9) we know that a C/NR equilibrium is less risky if 
)(αΦ<F .  Let A and B denote the numerator and dominator of )(αΩ  in (17), respectively.  
Then 0>Ω  as long as A and B have the same sign.  Otherwise, 0<Ω .  Note that 0>A  for all 𝛼 
if 1αρ < , and 0<B  for all 𝛼 if )2/()1( δδρ −−< .  Moreover, )(αΩ  approaches either ∞+  or 
∞−  as )]2(/[)1( δρδα −−→ .  Using (17), we find 
2
)2/1()()('
B
AB ND δρππδρα −−−−=Ω ,    (A18) 
which is positive if both A and B are negative, but negative if both A and B are positive.  
Setting )()( αα Φ=Ω , we obtain a quadratic equation of the form 02 =−+ RQαα  with 
0>Q  and 0>R .  It is easy to see that this equation has a positive root and a negative root.  Let 
4α  denote the positive root.  
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Part (i) of Proposition 2 follows from that, in the case where )}2/()1(,min{ 1 δδαρ −−< , 
we have B < 0 and 0/)( <=Ω BAα , and hence (16) is satisfied for all )1,0(∈α . 
In the case where )1/(2 00 δδδ +<  and 1αρ > , ρ  can be either greater or less than 
)2/()1( δδ −− .  If ))2/()1(,( 1 δδαρ −−∈ , we have B < 0, 0)( >Ω α  and 0)(' >Ω α  for 
)1,/( 1 ραα ∈ .  If )1),2/()1(( δδρ −−∈ , we have B < 0, 0)( >Ω α  and 0)(' >Ω α  for 
))2(/)1(,/( 1 δρδραα −−∈ , and )(αΩ  approaches ∞+  as α  approaches )2(/)1( δρδ −−  
from the left.  Since 0)(' <Φ α , the )(αΦ curve and )(αΩ  curve intercept at 
)2(/)1(4 δρδα −−< .  These results imply that for ρ  in either of these two intervals, the )(αΩ  
curve is upward-sloping and (16) takes the form )(αΩ≥F  for α  between ρα /1  and 
}1,min{ 4α .  For ραα /1≤ , 0)( <Ω α  and hence )(αΩ≥F  holds for any positive F.  Taking 
into consideration the )(αΦ  curve, we conclude that a C/NR equilibrium prevails if 
)}(,0max{)( αα Ω>>Φ F  for }1,min{ 4αα < .   
In the case where )1/(2 00 δδδ +>  and )2/()1( δδρ −−> , 𝜌 can be either greater or less 
than 1α .  If )),2/()1(( 1αδδρ −−∈ , we have B > 0, 0)( >Ω α  and 0)(' <Ω α  for 
)1),2(/)1(( δρδα −−∈ .  If )1,( 1αρ ∈ , we have B > 0, 0)( >Ω α  and 0)(' <Ω α  for 
)/),2(/)1(( 1 ραδρδα −−∈ .  These results imply that for ρ  in either of these two intervals, 
the )(αΩ  curve is downward-sloping and (16) takes the form of )(αΩ≤F .  Therefore, we 
conclude that a C/NR equilibrium prevails if )}(),(min{ αα ΩΦ<F .   QED 
Proof of Proposition A1: Using (A9) and (A11), we find  
)1(
)]21()1()[()(ˆ)(ˆ
αδδαρ
ραδδρππαα
+−
−−−−
=Φ−Ψ
NM
,    (A19) 
60 
 
which has a positive sign if either 2/1≥ρ  or 2/1<ρ  and )]21(/[)1( ρδδρα −−< .  Note from 
(A8) that a C/R equilibrium can occur only if 1αα ≤ .  It can be shown that in the case 2/1<ρ , 
)]21(/[)1(1 ρδδρα −−<  if and only if )21/()( 00 δδδδρ −+−> .  Noting that 
2/1)21/()( 00 <−+− δδδδ , we conclude that )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Φ>Ψ  for all 1αα ≤  (see Figure A1-1) as 
long as )21/()( 00 δδδδρ −+−> .  If, on the other hand, )21/()( 00 δδδδρ −+−< , we have 
)(ˆ)(ˆ αα Φ<Ψ  for ))],21(/[)1(( 1αρδδρα −−∈ , which gives rise to the situation illustrated in 
Figure A1-2.  
Using (A11) and (A12), we find that )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Ω=Φ  at 1α  and )(ˆ)(ˆ αα Ω<Φ  for 1αα < .  The 
results then follow from the definitions of )(ˆ αΓ , )(ˆ αΦ , )(ˆ αΨ  and )(ˆ αΩ .  QED 
Proof of Lemma 1:  First, we consider S  and Sˆ .  Using (12) and (14), we find that 
)(2)()( 33
ND ππαα −=Ψ=Γ .  From (14) and (A9), it is clear that )(ˆ)( αα Ψ>Ψ . Thus, 
)(ˆ αΨ≤F  implies )(αΨ<F .  From (12), we find that 0)( 1 =Γ α  and 0)(' >Γ α  for 1αα > .  
Then 1
1 )( α>Γ− F  for any 0>F .  Hence, Γ≤ ˆα  implies )(1 F−Γ<α .  Therefore,  Sˆ  is a strict 
subset of S .   
Second, we compare T  and Tˆ .  We consider, separately, the three cases in Proposition 2.  
(i) In the case where )}2/()1(,min{ 1 δδαρ −−< , 0<k  and )(αΩ≥F  holds for any F > 0 
and )1,0(∈α . On the other hand, Tˆ  admits only those )(ˆ αΩ≤F .  Thus, Tˆ  is a strict subset 
of T  in this case.   
(ii) In the case where )1/(2 00 δδδ +<  and 1αρ > , we have 0<k , 0)(' >Ω α  and 0)( ≥Ω α  
for ))2(/)1(,/[ 1 δρδραα −−∈ .  On the other hand,  0)('ˆ <Ω α  and 0)(ˆ ≥Ω α  for 
)1(/1 <≤ ραα .  Hence, )()(ˆ
11 FF −− Ω<Ω  for any F > 0.  This implies that Tˆ  is a strict 
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subset of T  in this case.  Graphically, T (respectively, Tˆ ) contains all the points to the left of 
the curve represented by )(αΩ=F  (respectively, )(ˆ αΩ=F ) for F > 0.  Since the )(αΩ=F  
curve lies to the right of the )(ˆ αΩ=F  curve for F > 0, T  contains more points than Tˆ .    
(iii) In the case where )1/(2 00 δδδ +>  and )2/()1( δδρ −−> , we have 0>k , 0)(' <Ω α  
and 0)( ≥Ω α  for ]/),2(/)1(( 1 ραδρδα −−∈ .  From (17) and (A12), we find that 
)(ˆ)( αα Ω>Ω  for )/),2(/)1(( 1 ραδρδα −−∈ .  Moreover, ∞→Ω )(α  as α  approaches 
)2(/)1( δρδ −−  from the left, and ∞→Ω )(ˆ α  as 0→α .  Hence, )(ˆ αΩ≤F  implies 
)(αΩ≤F  but not the other way around, i.e., Tˆ  is a strict subset of T .  QED 
Proof of Lemma 2: Using (9) and (A11), we can show that 0)()(ˆ >Φ−Φ αα  for ]1,0[∈α . QED 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Since )()(ˆ αα Φ>Φ  (by Lemma 2), )(ˆ αΦ≥F  implies )(αΦ>F .  
Then a C/R equilibrium could prevail both with and without the NIIC if )(ˆ αΦ≥F .  The NIIC 
reduces collusion if )(ˆ αΦ≥F  because Sˆ  is a strict subset of S.   
In the case in which )(αΦ≤F , we have )(ˆ αΦ<F .  Then a C/NR equilibrium could prevail 
both with and without the NIIC.  If the boundary of C/NR equilibria without the NIIC is 
determined by (16), then Lemma 1 (specifically, TT ⊂ˆ ) implies that the NIIC reduces collusion.  
However, for )}2/()1(,min{ 1 δδαρ −−<  set T does not impose any restrictions on the boundary 
of C/NR equilibria, in which case the NIIC does not necessarily reduce collusion.    
In the case in which ))(ˆ),(( αα ΦΦ∈F , a C/R equilibrium without the NIIC and a C/NR 
equilibrium with the NIIC prevail if there is collusion before and after the NIIC, which means 
that the NIIC reduces revelation.  The examples in Figures 4 and 5 prove the point that the NIIC 
may increase collusion.   QED 
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Proof of Proposition 4:  A sufficient condition for the NIIC to increase collusion is that 
)}(),({max)(ˆ ααα ΦΨ>Ω  at 1αα = , in which case there is collusion with the NIIC but no 
collusion without it for F between )}(),({max 11 αα ΦΨ  and )(ˆ 1αΩ .  (The )(αΓ  curve does not 
affect the boundary of collusion at 1αα =  because 0)( 1 =Γ α ). Using (9) and (A12), we find 
that )()(ˆ αα Φ>Ω  at 1αα = .  Using (14) and (A12), we can show that )()(ˆ αα Ψ>Ω  at 1αα =  
if (19) holds.  In other words, (19) is a sufficient condition for the NIIC to increase collusion.  
Regarding the two thresholds of ρ in Proposition 2, it is easy to show that 
100 )32/()( αδδδδ >−+−  if and only if 3/20 >δ , and )2/()1()32/()( 00 δδδδδδ −−>−+−  
if and only if )23/()2( 00 δδδ −−> .  Under these conditions for 0δ  and δ , there is a range of 
ρ  for which both (19) and )}2/()1(,{max 1 δδαρ −−>  hold.   QED 
Proof of Lemma 3: Follows from the comparison of (20), (21) and (22).  QED 
Proof of Proposition 5: Since 21 CC αα < , the IC3 constraint is satisfied for both firms if 1Cαα ≤ .  
The assumptions in this section ensure that the other conditions for a C/NR equilibrium without 
the NIIC are satisfied.  Hence, a C/NR equilibrium without the NIIC prevails if 1Cαα ≤ .  
Under the NIIC regime, a C/NR equilibrium with firm i as the instigator could be sustained if 
}ˆ,ˆmin{ NICj
I
Ci ααα ≤  ( ij ≠ ).   Lemma 3 and 21 CC αα <  imply that 
NI
C
NI
C
I
C 112 ˆ}ˆ,ˆmin{ ααα = .  Note 
that a firm has an incentive to propose and the other will accept a collusive agreement at stages 1 
and 2 of the game as long as the agreement yields higher payoffs than competition for both firms.  
Hence, the critical value of α for collusion is the larger of the two critical values associated with 
each of the two firms being the instigator.  In other words, a C/NR equilibrium prevails if 
{ }NICNICIC 121 ˆ},ˆ,ˆmin{max αααα ≤ .  QED 
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Proof of Proposition 6: Recall that without the NIIC, a C/NR equilibrium prevails if 1Cαα ≤ .  
Then the NIIC increases collusion if and only if  
{ } 1121 ˆ},ˆ,ˆmin{max CNICNICIC αααα > .   (A20) 
Since 11ˆ C
NI
C αα <  by Lemma 3, (A20) is satisfied if and only if 121 }ˆ,ˆmin{ C
NI
C
I
C ααα > .  There are 
two cases to consider: 
(a) If IC
NI
C 12 ˆˆ αα ≤ , then 
NI
C
NI
C
I
C 221 ˆ}ˆ,ˆmin{ ααα = , in which case 12ˆ C
NI
C αα >  ensures that (A20) holds. 
(b) If IC
NI
C 12 ˆˆ αα > , then 
I
C
NI
C
I
C 121 ˆ}ˆ,ˆmin{ ααα = , in which case (A20) holds by Lemma 3.   
Therefore, 12ˆ C
NI
C αα >  is sufficient for (A20) to hold.  To prove that this condition is necessary, 
observe that if 12ˆ C
NI
C αα ≤ , (A20) does not hold in case (a) and the situation in case (b) cannot 
arise.  QED   
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Appendix 3:  Alternative Timing 
Here we present and analyze a modified game in which each firm makes a decision on whether 
to report to the antitrust authority (the AA) at the same time as its decision on whether to defect.  
Specifically, the game proceeds as follows: 
• Stages 1: Each firm chooses simultaneously whether to instigate.  
• Stage 2: If there has been instigation by one firm, the other firm either agrees to form a 
cartel or refuses to do so.  
• Stage 3: Each firm chooses from the following four possible actions:  Collusion and Not 
Revealing (C/NR), Collusion and Revealing (C/R), Defection and Not Revealing (D/NR), 
and Defection and Revealing (D/R).  
• Stage 4: The AA launches an investigation with probability 𝛼.  If a collusive agreement is 
in place and neither firm reveals, the investigation leads to a conviction with probability 
𝜌. 
All other aspects of this model are the same as those in the original model in the main text.  We 
will continue to use strategic riskiness as a selection criterion in cases of multiple equilibriums in 
a stage game.  
We focus on the case where the two firms are identical ex ante, and continue to use  𝜋𝑁, 𝜋𝑀, 
𝜋𝐷 and  𝜋𝑆 to denote a firm’s per-period profits under static Nash equilibrium, collusion and 
defection.  In addition, we define 𝜋𝐵 as a firm’s profits in a period when both firms defect at the 
same time.  We assume that 𝜋𝐷 > 𝜋𝑀 >  𝜋𝑁  > 𝜋𝐵 ≥  𝜋𝑆.   
Let 𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 denote a firm’s discounted sum of profits when both firms play Collusion and Not 
Revealing in every period for as long as they are not caught by the AA.  The value of  𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 is 
not affected by the change of timing in this model.  Then from (6) in the main text, we have  
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Below we examine the equilibriums of this model for the case of a leniency program without 
and then with a NIIC.  From this examination we will derive the conditions under which the 
NIIC increases the occurrence of collusion.   
A3.1. Leniency Program without the NIIC 
The analysis proceeds in the same way as the one in the main text.  We will start by considering 
the firms’ decisions at stage 3 of the modified game after the two firms have reached a collusive 
agreement.  In Table A3-1 are the payoff pairs associated with different strategy profiles of the 
two firms.   
Table A3-1: The Subgame at Stage 3 in the absence of the NIIC 
        Firm 2       
 
Firm 1 
Collusion and Not 
Revealing (C/NR) 
Collusion and  
Revealing (C/R) 
Defection and Not 
Revealing (D/NR) 
Defection and 
Revealing (D/R) 
Collusion and 
Not Revealing 
(C/NR) 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 ,𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1−𝛿 − 𝐹,     𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
Collusion and  
Revealing 
(C/R) 
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,   
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
,     𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
  
Defection and 
Not Revealing 
(D/NR) 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹, 
𝜋𝑆 +  𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
Defection and 
Revealing 
(D/R) 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
,     𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
−
𝐹
2
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It is easy to see from Table A3-1 that the strategy profile (D/R, D/R) (i.e., both firms choose 
Defection and Revealing) is a Nash equilibrium in this stage-game.  Moreover, (C/NR, C/NR) 
(i.e., both firms choose Collusion and Not Revealing) can be a Nash equilibrium under certain 
conditions.  To see the latter, note that the strategies C/R and D/NR are dominated by D/R for 
each firm.  As a result, (C/NR, C/NR) is a Nash equilibrium if  
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 ≥ 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 .               (𝐴22) 
In the case where (A22) is satisfied and hence there are two Nash equilibriums at stage 3, we 
select the equilibrium that is less risky in the sense of Blonski and Spagnolo (2014).  To be more 
specific, the Collusion and No Revealing (CNR) equilibrium is less risky than the Defect and 
Reveal equilibrium if 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 + �𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹� ≥ �𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿� + �𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹2� .        (𝐴23)  
Rearranging (A23), we obtain 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 − �𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿� ≥ 𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆 + 𝐹2 (> 0).               (𝐴24) 
It is easy to see that (A24) implies (A22).  Therefore, (C/NR, C/NR) would be the equilibrium 
outcome at stage 3 if (A24) is satisfied.   
To find out the restrictions imposed by (A24) on the parameters of the model, substituting 
(A21) for 𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 into (A24), we obtain: 
𝐹 ≤ Δ ≡
𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)(𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑁) − (𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑀) − [1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)](𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆)
𝛼𝜌 + [1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)] 2⁄ .      (𝐴25) 
A necessary condition for (A25) to hold is that Δ > 0.  The latter is satisfied if 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑐 and 
𝛼𝜌 < 1 − 𝛿𝑐/𝛿, where  
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𝛿𝑐 ≡
(𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑀) + (𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆)(𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑁) + (𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆) < 1.               (𝐴26) 
It is easy to verify that 𝛿𝑐 > 𝛿0. 
For Collusion and No Revealing to be the equilibrium outcome of the entire game, it is 
necessary that each firm’s discounted sum of profits, 𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶, is at least as high as that of no 
collusion, 𝜋𝑁 (1 − 𝛿)⁄ .  This condition is satisfied by (A24) because 𝜋𝐷 > 𝜋𝑁.  
If (A24) is not satisfied, on the other hand, Defection and Revealing becomes the equilibrium 
outcome at stage 3.   Since 𝜋𝑁 > 𝜋𝐵 implies  
𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 > 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹2 ,                   (𝐴27) 
the firms will not enter into a collusive agreement at stages 1 and 2 of the game.   Therefore,   
Proposition A2:  Under a leniency program without the NIIC, both firms choose Collusion and 
Not Revealing in equilibrium if 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑐, 𝛼𝜌 < 1 − 𝛿𝑐/𝛿, and 𝐹 satisfies (A25).  Otherwise, no 
collusion occurs in equilibrium. 
A3.2. Leniency Program with the NIIC  
Now we consider the subgame at stage 3 under the NIIC.  Without loss of generality, suppose 
that this subgame is reached after firm 1 has instigated.  As can be seen from the payoff pairs in 
Table A3-2, for firm 1 D/R is now weakly dominated by D/NR.  Note, moreover, that in the 
event that firm 2 chooses C/NR, firm 1 would earn a strictly higher payoff by playing D/NR than 
D/R.   Since (C/NR, C/NR) is a possible equilibrium in this subgame, it is reasonable to assume 
that firm 1 will never play D/R in equilibrium.   
The strategy profile (C/NR, C/NR) would indeed be a Nash equilibrium at stage 3 if  
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 ≥ 𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝛼𝜌𝐹              (𝐴28) 
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holds for firm 1 and (A22) holds for firm 2.   Note, however, that the former is implied by the 
latter.  On the other hand, (D/NR, D/R) is a Nash equilibrium at stage 3 irrespective of whether 
(A22) is satisfied or not.  
Table A3-2: The Subgame at Stage 3 in the presence the NIIC (Firm 1 being the instigator) 
        Firm 2       
 
Firm 1 
Collusion and Not 
Revealing (C/NR) 
Collusion and  
Revealing (C/R) 
Defection and Not 
Revealing (D/NR) 
Defection and 
Revealing (D/R) 
Collusion and 
Not Revealing 
(C/NR) 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 ,𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1−𝛿 − 𝐹,     𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
Collusion and  
Revealing 
(C/R) 
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,   
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝑀 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
Defection and 
Not Revealing 
(D/NR) 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹, 
𝜋𝑆 +  𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝛼𝜌𝐹  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
Defection and 
Revealing 
(D/R) 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,  
𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹 
𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹  
𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
− 𝐹,     𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁
1−𝛿
  
 
The (C/NR, C/NR) equilibrium involves a smaller strategic risk than the (D/NR, D/R) 
equilibrium for the two firms if 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 + �𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹� ≥ �𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝛼𝜌𝐹� + �𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹�          (𝐴29) 
holds for firm 1 and 
𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 + �𝜋𝑆 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝛼𝜌𝐹� ≥ �𝜋𝐷 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿� + �𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿�          (𝐴30) 
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holds for firm 2.   It can be verified that (A30) implies (A29).  In addition, (A30) also implies 
(A22).  Therefore, (C/NR, C/NR) would prevail as the equilibrium outcome at stage 3 as long as 
(A30) is satisfied.  
If (A30) does not hold, on the other hand, (D/NR, D/R) becomes the equilibrium outcome at 
stage 3.   Since 𝜋𝑁 > 𝜋𝐵  implies  
𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 > 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 > 𝜋𝐵 + 𝛿𝜋𝑁1 − 𝛿 − 𝐹,                   (𝐴31) 
the firms will not enter into a collusive agreement at stages 1 and 2 of the game.    
Substituting (A21) for 𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐶 into (A31), we obtain  
𝐹 ≤ Δ� ≡
𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)(𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑁) − (𝜋𝐷 − 𝜋𝑀) − [1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)](𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝑆)
𝛼𝜌[2 − 𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝜌)] .      (𝐴32) 
Note that the numerator of Δ� is the same as that of Δ in (A25).  Hence, Δ� > 0 if 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑐 and 
𝛼𝜌 < 1 − 𝛿𝑐/𝛿.  Then we have:  
Proposition A3:  Under a leniency program with the NIIC, both firms choose Collusion and Not 
Revealing in equilibrium if 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑐, 𝛼𝜌 < 1 − 𝛿𝑐/𝛿, and 𝐹 satisfies (A32).  Otherwise, no 
collusion occurs in equilibrium.   
A3.3. Effects of the NIIC 
A comparison of Propositions A2 and A3 suggests that the effect of the NIIC depends on which 
of (A25) and (A32) is a tighter constraint.  To be more specific, the NIIC expands the set of 
parameters for which Collusion and No Revealing is the equilibrium outcome if (A25) is tighter 
than (A32).   
Proposition A4: If 𝛿 > 𝛿𝑐 and 𝛼𝜌 < min{1 2⁄ , 1 − 𝛿𝑐/𝛿}, then Δ� > Δ > 0 and the NIIC causes 
Collusion and No Revealing to become the equilibrium outcome for 𝐹 in the range (Δ,Δ�]. 
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Proof: Noting that the numerators of Δ and Δ� are identical, we can show that Δ� > Δ if 𝛼𝜌 < 1 2⁄ .  
The result then follows from Propositions A2 and A3.    QED   
Therefore, this modified model yields qualitatively the same conclusion as the original model; 
that is, the NIIC can increase collusion under certain conditions.  Specifically, if the time 
discount factor is not too small, the probability of detection and conviction (𝛼𝜌) is not too large 
and the fine upon conviction is in the intermediate range, there would be no collusion in the 
absence of the NIIC but there is collusion with the NIIC in place. 
On the other hand, these two models differ in that, in the present model, no firm ever reports 
to the AA in equilibrium. But the richer structure of the original model generates equilibriums in 
which firms actually choose to reveal under some circumstances.  In the latter case, the NIIC 
reduces the occurrence of revelation in equilibrium.     
 
 
 
